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NOTES.
DISCOVERY-PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS IN ACTION
AT LAW.-A United States statute 1 reads: "In the trial of ac-
tions at law, the courts of the United States may, on motion and
due notice thereof, require the parties to produce books or writings
in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to
the issue, in cases and under circumstances Where they might be
compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of producing
in. chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the
court may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as in
cases of non-suit; and if a defendant fails to comply with such order,
the court may, on motion, give judgment against him by default."
Held, that this section does not authorize the courts to compel
the production of books or papers for the inspection of the other
party before the trial, but only at the trial
2
There is pronounced division of authority on this question, as
noted by the court; and they therefore state a number of reasons for
1Sec. 724, Rev. St., U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 583.
2 Carpenter v. Winn, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 683 (191o).
(202)
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the position which they have taken: (i) The word "trial" should be
considered as meaning the examination and decision of the issues in
an action at law; not every step in the cause from the time issue is
joined. (2) "In the trial" should be considered as implying "a re-
stricted use of the procedure as compared to a bill of discovery,"
where the matter is necessarily produced and examined before the
trial at law. (3) Because of the severity of the penalty, in case of
non-production of the papers, the party against whom the order is
made would probably want to avail himself of his under-rated right
to all the objections which he could make, were he a defendant in
equity to a bill of discovery of the same evidence; and this would
mean practically two trials of the same issue.
In an early case in the Circuit Court for Massachusetts much
the same view was taken.3 This decision was reached under the
fifteenth section of the Act of Sept. 24, 1789;4 but sec. 724 of the
present Act is taken practically verbatim from this earlier statute,
so that the case is entirely in point. The same question was raised
a little later in the same court, and the following extract from Mr.
Justice Clifford's opinion is of interest in this connection: "No doubt
is entertained that the motion may be made, in a pending action
at law, before the day of trial; but the requirement of the order of
the court must, perhaps, be that the books and writings be produced
at the trial of the action. . . . Production before the trial is not,
perhaps, contemplated by the words of the provision." This would
seem to show that, despite the previous decision,' the learned justice
was in doubt on the point; and in a subsequent case in the same
court, the previous cases have been taken to represent a difference
of opinion.7 In the principal case this interpretation was not put
on the words of Mr. Justice Clifford. The first, and apparently
only, case in which a Circuit Court of Appeals has been called upon
to determine the question is Cassatt v. Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. ;s
and it was there said that the production should only be at, not be-
fore, the trial. This view undoubtedly had considerable influence
upon the decision in the present case,9 as indicated in the opinion.
In the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey it was decided
that the section under consideration-namely sec. 724- should be
interpreted in the narrow sense, that is, as allowing the production
to be compelled only at the trial;10 but it is interesting to note that
'Iasigi v. Brown, i Curtis (C. C.) 4oi (1853).
'I Stat. at Large, 82.
'Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Boston v. State Nat'l Bank of Boston, 3
Clifford (C. C.) 201 (I868).
£ lasigi v. Brown, supra.
" Caspary v. Carter, 84 Fed. 416 (C. C. 1897).
as io Fed. 32 (1907).
'Caipenter v. Winn, supra.
" United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 75 Fed. 94 (i896).
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Mr. Justice Green, in delivering the opinion of the court, substitutes
the phrase "on the trial" for "in the trial", as the statute reads. It
is quite probable that he is only reading into the Act the court's
prior interpretation of it, so that the result of the case was not
affected by the error; but he is certainly begging the question, so
far as argument goes.
The courts which take the other, and what may be called the
broader, view of the statute, argue that the very purpose of this
provision was to give a substitute for the equitable bill of discovery,
and that this will not be done, if the court cannot compel the pro-
duction of the books or papers before, as well as on, the trial." Here
again there has been confusion in decisions in the same Circuit Court.
In Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise du Telegraph de Paris a New
York,12 the court said: "Under the existing practice in courts oi
law in this State, a plaintiff can obtain . . . a production of
books and papers both before and upon the trial"; and a little further
on: "The practice which thus prevails is the practice of the federal
courts also, by force of sects. 724, 858, 914 Rev. St." But Mr.
Justice Wallace, who delivered the opinion, went on to say that the
plaintiff "cannot obtan the testimony of the defendant before the
trial in an action pending in this court," i. e., an action at law. Mr.
Justice Lacombe, in Guyot v. Hilton,13 proceeded on the assumption
that the previous case held that the production of books and papers
could not be compelled before trial, apparently applying the later
quotation concerning testimony to the production of books and
papers, whereas there is a clear dictum in the earlier case to the
contrary.
Sufficient has been said to show that there has existed a dis-
tinct division of authorities on this question. The decision in the
present case' 4 has the effect of settling this difference. Whether
the view here taken is considered the better, depends largely on
whether one believes that Congress intended to allow a complete
substitute at law for the equitable bill of discovery, or only a partial
and supplemental one. This in turn depends primarily on the con-
struction put on the phrase "In the trial of actions at law." The
purpose of the statute must have been to expedite the business of the
courts; and this will be considerably more effectually done by the
broader interpretation of the section than by that put upon it in the
present case. ,Furthermore, it would not have required a strained
Exchange NatVl Bank of Atchison v. Wachita Cattle Co., 61 Fed. i9o
(C. C. 1894); Lucker v. Phcenix Assurance Co. of London, 67 Fed. i8 (C.
C. i895); J. B. Brewster & Co. v. Tuthill Springs Co. et al., 34 Fed 769 (C.
C. 1888); Jacques v. Collins, et al., 2 Blatchford (U. S. C. C.) 23 (1846);
Victor G. Bloede Co. v. J. Bancroft & Sons Co., 98 Fed. 175 (C. C. 1899),
which gives a review of the decisions on both sides of the question.
1'23 Fed. 82 (1885).
1332 Fed. 743 (1887).
" Carpenter v. Winn, supra.
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construction of the very phrase in controversy, which can hardly
have been employed with the intention of limiting such action to the
actual trial of the case; for that interpretation prevents the party
seeking the evidence from properly preparing his case, except by
employing the equitable bill of discovery, and, as above indicated re-
moves half the efficiency of the statute. The section in question
says nothing as to allowing the substitution of the legal remedy only
on the trial; and if the framers had so intended, they would very
probably have said so. It, therefore, appears that the decision in the
present case, while based on strong grounds, might have had an
even stronger foundation, if it had taken the broader view; and it
would certainly have had a more beneficial result.
L.C.A.
FRAUD-RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO RESCIND-NECESSITY FOR PE-
CUNIARY Loss.-The principal question of legal import in King v.
Lamborn 1 is whether the false representation of a material fact
by which a purchase of property is intentionally induced amounts
to fraud which vitiates the contract, and entitles the purchaser to
rescind without showing any substantial injury in a pecuniary way.
The court answered the question in the affirmative.
Where recovery is sought on the ground of misrepresentation
and deceit, the proper measure of damages is the difference between
the actual value of that which the complainant parts with and the ac-
tual value of that which he receives under his contract-the loss really
sustained in a pecuniary sense.2 It is apparent that this rule does
not afford relief to one who has been misled and entrapped into
purchasing something for which he did not bargain unless he has
suffered pecuniary loss. 3 And, in the words of the court in the
1186 Fed. 21 (C. C. A. Ninth Cir. I9I1).
' Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. Div. 541 (1887) ; Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125
(1889); Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U. S. 116 (1goo); Alden v. Wright, 49 N. W.
767 (Minn. i8gi); High v. Berret, 148 Pa. 261 (1892). A strong line of
decisions must he noted, however, which allow the defrauded party to re-
cover in his tort action not only his actual loss but the benefit of his bargain
had the thing been as represented. This is probably the predominant view
in America today. It has been adopted in Illinois, Autle v. Sexton, 137
Ill. 410 (1891) ; Massachusetts, Morse v. Hutchins, iO2 Mass. 439 (I869), and
New York, Ettlinger v. Weil, 184 N. Y. 179 (i9o6); and has the support
of an eminent authority on damages, 2 Sedg-vick on Dam:, § 777, et seq. But
all the cases which have adopted this rule can be traced to Sherwood v. Sut-
ton, 5 Mason I (1827), where this rule is printed in the headnote, but the
decision by Mr. Justice Story, then on Circuit, is a statement of the rule
referred to supra as the proper rule. Mr. Sedgwick himself quotes from
this opinion by Story, J.. in his text, but misinterprets it. For the leading
cases on both sides of this question see Fargo Gas Co. v. Electric Co., 4 N.
D. 219 (1894).
'Urtz v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 95 N. E. 71 (N. Y. I911).
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principal case, "there may be an injury without pecuniary loss that
is as revolting to conscience as if actual damages bad ensued." But
it must be remembered that courts of justice do not act as mere
tribunals of conscience to enforce duties which are purely moral.4
The cases which have denied equitable relief unless pecuniary
damage is shown rely mainly on this statement by Mr. justice
Strong: "Cancelling an executed contract is an exertion of the
most extraordinary powers of a court of equity, which should not
be exercised unless the falsity of the alleged false representations is
certainly proved and unless the complainant has been deceived and
injured by them." 5 The bill was dismissed in that case because the
fraud alleged was not proved. The complainant had suffered no
injury of any kind; and, it is submitted, Strong, J., did not mean to
limit equitable relief to cases of pecuniary injury.6
The authority of an eminent text writer would seem to be
against the principal case, Mr. Pomeroy thus stating the law:
"Fraud without resulting pecuniary damage is not a ground for the
exercise of remedial jurisdiction, equitable or legal." 7 But the
chancery cases cited do not emphasize the necessity for pecuniary
damage. And Justice Story makes no mention of pecuniary damages,
simply stating the law to be "that fraud and damage coupled together
will entitle the injured party to relief in equity," s quoting from
Chancellor Kent's decision in Bacon v. Bronson. 9 A New York
Supreme Court case 10 and a recent Western case" adopt Mr.
Pomeroy's view; but no equity cases are cited by these courts in
support of their position. The former case has been overruled; 12
and the Nebraska decision was modified by the case of like caption
in io 9 N. W. 388, where an attempt is made to reconcile the con-
flicting decisions, and a new rule is enunciated, that where the
vendor, by fraud or false representations, has induced the buyer
to accept something not contemplated by the contract, the vendee
may rescind without showing pecuniary injury or damage; but where
the buyer receives what he actually purchased, and loses his right
to rescind on some false representation as to its qualtiy, condition, or
matter affecting its value, he must show that such representation was
material and that he was misled thereby to his injury and damage.
'2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 386; i Story, Eq. Jur. 238.
'Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James, 94 U. S. 207 (1876).
'See Bispham, Prin. of Eq. § 217.
'Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 898. See also Eaton on Equity, 299.
'Story, Eq. Jur. § 203.
'7 Johns. Ch. R. I94 (N. Y. 1823).
" Hewlett v. Spring Co., 84 Hun, 248 (1895).
Jakway v. Proudfit, io6 N. W. io39 (Neb. i9o6).
"arlow v. Brum, 151 Fed. N. Y. 278 (1897).
NO TES
The weight of authority is certainly against Pomeroy and these
sporadic decisions, and in accord with the principal case.13 The law
is correctly stated by Baldwin, J., in Brett v. Cooney: 1 4 fraudulent
representations constitute no ground for equitable relief unless made
to one who was induced by them to act to his injury; but in measuring
injury, equity does not concern itself merely with money losses.
If it finds that a clear right has been invaded, it will seldom refuse
its aid because the plaintiff can show no substantial damage to his
pecuniary interests.'5 And the party in the wrong should not be
heard to say that no real injury can result from the fact misrepre-
sented.16 Obviously, different questions will arise when it is sought
to determine the measure of damages recoverable for such a fraud.
C.L.M.
WILLS-CHARITABLE BEQUESTS-PRECATORY WoRDs.-In Stin-
son's Estate (No. I)' the testatrix's will provided: "I give
and bequeath" certain property, "to start and use for a Women's
Christian Association. . . . I hereby appoint or wish the institu-
tion to be carried out upon the plan of the Women's Christian Asso-
ciation of Philadelphia. . . I would like the executive com-
mittee to consist of the following ladies." One of the ladies named
was a witness to the will. The Act of 18552 provides that wills con-
taining charitable bequests must be "attested by two credible and at
the time disinterested witnesses." The court held the bequest void
because of the interest of the witness in question.
The case appears to raise two questions: first, should the pre-
catory words, "I would like," be construed as a mandatory direction
as to who shall compose" the executive committee; and second, under
such construction, is a person so named interested within the intent
of the act. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, main-
tains that the words are a mere expression of advice or desire and
supports this view -with numerous cases.3  The authority of these
cases is unquestioned and they have been followed in recent decis-
'Mather v. Barnes, 146 Fed. iooo (i9o6); Williams v. Kerr, 152 Pa.
56o (x893); Hansen v. Allen, 117 Wis. 61 (i9o3).
"475 Conn. 338 (1902).
"'Wainscott v. Bid. & Loan Assn., 98 Cal. 253 (893).
'MacLaren v. Cochran, 46 N. W. 408 (Minn. 189o).
1232 Pa. 218 (Igil).
'Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 332.
Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268 (1853); Janretch v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466
(1865); Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. 219 (1866); Bowlby v. Thunder, io5 Pa.
173 (1884); Burt v. Herron, 66 Pa. 400 (387o); Hopkins v. Hunt, iii Pa.
287 (1885).
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ions,4 but it is submitted that they are not conclusive upon the point
in question. In Burt v. Herron, 5 Sharswood, J., said: "Precatory
words . . . will not in general convert a devisee . . . into a
trustee," and in the same case he pointed out that there is no case
where "words expressive of desire as to the direct disposition of the
estate have not been held sufficient. . . . It is different where,
having made a disposition, he (the testator) expresses a desire that
the legatee or devisee should make a certain use of his bounty." In
the principal case, the will itself creates the legatee; and it would
seem that words describing that legatee, are of the substance of the
disposition, and not a limitation on a disposition already completely
made. The majority opinion held the direction mandatory.
On the question of the interest of a person thus appointed to
the first executive committee, the court said: "In testing the qualifi-
cation of witnesses to a deed or will by which a charity is created
the situation is just the same as if the charity was in existence."
This seems to follow from the words of the act, and has also been
laid down in Kessler's Estate :6 "The interest which disqualifies a
witness under the act is such an interest as appears to exist at the
time of the execution of the will, either by the terms of the will
itself, or by reason of the attesting witnesses being then interested 7
in the religious or charitable institutions for which provision is made
by the testator, or both, or either, as the case may be." Mr. Justice
Stewart contended that the facts of the principal case did not bring
it'within this rule, and that the contingent quality of the interest
took it out of the intent of the act. He said: "It is upon this
ground that we have held that executors are not disqualified." It is
submitted that a study of the cases on interest under the Act of 1855
will show that the contingent quality of the interest has in no case
been the ruling ground for the decision. The case of Snyder v. Bull"
arose before the act, and the question was the proper proof of a
will under the Act of I833.9 An executor was a witness, and after
giving the contingent quality of his interest as a ground for his
competency, the court said: "But in contemplation of law an
executorship is not an office of profit. In England the services are
gratuitous and though they are paid for here the design of allow-
ance is compensation. . . . Unlike a legatee, he is not the testa-
'In re Estate of Hugh Bellas, 176 Pa. 122 (1896).
66 Pa. 4oo (1870).
4221 Pa. 314 (198o).
' Employment by the institution as a servant is not such interest as is
meant. Coomb's & Hankinson's Appeal, IO5 Pa. 155 (1884). Cf. Words of
auditing judge in Kessler's Estate, 221 Pa. 314 (19o8): "It would seem that
those who gather its assets, conserve and expend them, and upon whom
the financial existence of the church depends, are such persons who, under
the terms of the act, are interested."
3 17 Pa. 54 (I85I).
' April 8, 1833, P. L. 249.
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tor's beneficiary."' 0 In Jordan's Estate1 ' the leading case on the same
question since the act, these words are used: "But even in the event
of his assumption of duties he can receive no more than compensation
for the services which he may have rendered. . . He could
have no conceivable motive in unduly influencing the act of the testa-
tor, nor interest in the subject matter of the future controversy, and
had therefore no legal interest." In Jeane's Estate, 2 the latest case
on the question, where the witness was both executor and an officer
of the company which was trustee of the gift for charitable uses,
it was held, "The reasoning of our cases which hold that the com-
pensation of an executor for his services does not disqualify him,
applies with no less force to the services which may be rendered by
the Pennsylvania Company in paying the dividends to the Children's
Hospital." The court distinguishes Kessler's Estate 13 on the ground
that in that case, the witness in addition to being trustee and execu-
tor, was an officer of the church which was the beneficiary. It is
submitted that it is the beneficial quality of the interest of a witness
that brings it within the act; that its contingency has no rational
bearing on the question, because, whether a man be executor, legatee,
or officer of a charitable beneficiary under a will, the receipt of his
bequest or the devolution of his duties thereunder, are subject to the
same contingencies, e. g., the will may be revoked; or he may die
before the testator. If this interpretation of the cases be accepted,
the decision of the principal case is in full accord with the existing
law.
F.L.B.
WILLS-SEcRET TRUST TO DEFEAT A MORTMAIN STATUTE.-
The question, whether a secret trust attached to an alternative be-
quest, which, by the terms of a will, was to become effective in case
the testatrix died within one calendar month, is discussed in the
case of Stirk's Estate.'
The facts of the case presented a very interesting problem. The
testatrix in her will bequeathed her residuary estate to a charity.
The scrivener, knowing that the testatrix was about to undergo
a serious operation, prepared a codicil in which was contained an
alternative bequest, in case of the death of the testatrix within one
"For authority that the correct theory of the commissions of executors
and trustees is compensation for work done, see McCausland's Appeal, 38
Pa. 466 (i86i); Montgomery's Appeal, 86 Pa. 23 (1878); Henson's Estate,
217 Pa. 207 (Igo7).
11161 Pa. 393 (1894).
"228 Pa. 314 (Io8).
13221 Pa. 314 (i9o8).
'232 Pa. 98 (igii).
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month. The name of the legatee was not inserted by the scrivener
before the codicil was read to the testatrix; but she was told
that in case of her death within thirty days, the gift to the charity
would be void under the Act of 1855,2 that therefore it became neces-
sary for her to consider to whom should go the amounts which she
had given to charity in such event. As to the residuary bequest she
said, "Give that to the company," meaning the trust company which
was to act as trustee of the original bequest. The court held that
this alternative bequest to the trust company was impressed with a
secret trust for charities and was void.
The question as to whether a bequest, absolute on its face, is
in reality a secret trust has been discussed in many cases in both
English and American courts. Judge Sharswood summarizes the
result of the English decisions as follows: 3 (I) If an absolute
estate is devised, but upon a secret trust assented to by the devisee,
either expressly or impliedly, by knowledge and silence before the
death of the testator, a court of equity will fasten a trust on him
on the ground of fraud, and consequently the statute of Mortmain
will avoid the devise, if the trust is in favor of a charity. (2) But if
the devisee have no part in the devise, and no knowledge of it until
after the death of the testator, there is no ground upon which equity
can fasten such a trust on him, even though after it comes to his
knowledge he should express an intention of conforming to the
wishes of the testator."
The important question, therefore, in every case is to determine
whether or not there has been any assent, express or implied.4 The
facts of the cases which fall under the second class referred to by
Judge Sharswood, disclose that the alternative bequest or the be-
quest to which there is attached the desire of the testator that the
legacy be laid out by the legatee for charity, was, in each instance,
made with full knowledge that the legatee was not bound to carry
out such desires and could do with the bequest what he willed. The
facts of Stirk's Estate show that the scrivener knew or had reason
to believe that the testatrix executed the codicil in the belief that the
trust company would be bound to carry out her desires that the
residuary estate should go to charity. The silence of the scrivener
under these circumstances amounted to assent and acquiescence, and
a trust was accordingly imposed upon the trust company. The be-
quest of the residue was treated as a gift induced by fraud and the
trust company, although innocent, was not allowed to gain any
benefit through the fraud of another. As is said in an old English
case,5 referred to in a case cited by the court,6 "No person can
P. L. 332.
Schultz's Appeal, 8o Pa. 396 (1876).
'Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450 (19o8).
'Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627 (Eng. 1755).
'Russell v. Jackson, Io Hare 212 (Eng. 1852). For a review of English
and American decisions see 2o L. R. A. 465, and 22 L. N. S. 1262.
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claim any interest under a fraud committed by another. However
innocent the party may be, if the original transaction is tainted With
fraud, that taint runs through the derivative interest and prevents
any party from claiming under it."
The only distinction that can possibly be drawn between the
principal case and the cases where the legatee actually promised
to carry out the trust, is that different parties committed a fraud
upon the testator. The reason for imposing a trust upon the legatee
who has made such a promise is that no one can claim any interest
in a fund acquired by fraud unless that person is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value. A legatee to whom a gift induced by fraud is
given, certainly can not be classed as a bona fide purchaser, and a
gift to such a person plainly falls within the first class of cases men-
tioned by Judge Sharswood.
R.B.W.
